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Abstract: This paper investigates how different message structures impact communication strategy
as well as sender and receiver behavior. Specifically, we focus on comparing communication games
with messages stating an intention versus a request. Our experimental results show that when a game
includes self-signaling or self-committing messages, the two message structures yield negligibly
different results. However, when the messages of the game are neither self-signaling nor selfcommitting, we find that more subjects send messages suggesting cooperation with request than
intention. Interestingly, subjects also deviate from their suggested actions more frequently with
request than intention. We surmise lying aversion plays a prominent role in contributing to the
differences in games where messages lack the self-committing property.
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1. Introduction
Farrell [1] suggested that the richness of messages should play a more prominent role
in game theory. Mounting empirical evidence supports this view. In relation to restricted
intention signaling, research suggests that economic outcomes may vary when players
can communicate using rich free-form language (see [2–6]). However, between intentionsignaling and free-form communication, many other forms of message structure exist, with
each possibly having differing impacts on economic outcomes. This paper examines the
effect of switching from intention-signaling to request-signaling on decision-making in
three 2-by-2 symmetric games.
We consider a group of two-stage games in which a player sends a non-binding cheap
talk message in the first stage and both players take simultaneous actions in the second
stage. We investigate how the message structure affects a player’s communication strategy
in the first stage and the subsequent action of each player in the second stage. Existing
experimental studies typically structured the messages in the form of “I plan to choose”,
or “I will choose”. What would happen if players communicate with requests instead of
intentions? To answer this query, this study uses a treatment with messages stating “I want
you to choose” in addition to a treatment with the standard message “I plan to choose”.
Lying typically requires greater mental effort than telling the truth, e.g., [7,8] show
that aversion to lying appears to be impacted by intuitive reasoning. When communicating
with a request, the message states a sender’s suggestion of the receiver’s behavior, rather
than giving a promise regarding her own intended action. Consequently, this subtle change
of message structure might motivate intuitive reasoning to change and likely prevents lying
aversion from influencing the sender’s selection of action. While previous experiments
(e.g., [9]) demonstrate that people have a preference for keeping their promises, as pointed
out by psychology literature (e.g., [10]), most of the lies people tell are not clear-cut.
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Using the assumption of lying aversion, Ellingsen and Östling [11] built a level-k
model on communication and fully characterized its effects in various environments. In
their analysis, the messages state the intention of the sender. They assume players have
a lexicographic preference for truth-telling; therefore, indifferent players send truthful
messages. The assumption reflects the notion that people are somewhat averse to lying,
without incurring the notational burden of explicit lying costs. However, removing this
assumption eliminates the ability for players to effectively communicate in their model. Towards the end of the paper, the authors ask “what would happen if players communicated
with requests instead?”. Instead of relying on the lying aversion of the sender to facilitate
effective communication, request based communication depends on a preference for the
receiver to follow a recommendation, i.e., an indifferent receiver selects the requested
action. We find that in games where players have an incentive to follow through with
the requested or intended action, for example in Mixed Motive games and coordination
games such as the Stag Hunt game, both request and intention signaling leads to similar
communication strategy and sender and receiver behavior. However, in games with little
or no incentive to select the action in a message, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, players
are less likely to send messages of cooperation with intention based messaging compared
to request based messaging. Moreover, in these games players also deviate from their
words more frequently with request than intention. Messages communicated implicitly are
presumably less subject to costs from lying aversion, so players in the request treatment
are more likely to send a message counter to their intent.
2. Literature Review
Early work by Farrell [12,13] and Rabin [14] pioneered the study of intention-signaling
in simple games with complete information. In these games, an underlying game is
preceded by a communication stage in which players make costless, nonbinding announcements about intended moves. Farrell argued that cheap talk could make equilibrium focal
and should not be ignored. Rabin [14] extended the analysis of Farrell [13] by having
players make repeated, simultaneous statements about their intended moves before a
coordination game, in contrast to Farrell where players made announcements sequentially.
This study has a structure more in line with Farrell [13] as only one player sends a message.
In the model of Rabin [14], behaviorally motivated restrictions on beliefs and unbounded
rounds of simultaneous communication lead to play on one of the Pareto-efficient equilibria.
The research of Farrel and Rabin led to the explosion of both experimental and theoretical
research on communication over the past thirty years.
Theory and empirical evidence reveals that the effectiveness of signaling in improving
economic outcomes depends on the payoff structure of the underlying game, as well as
the structure of the communication protocol (e.g., [15–23]). For instance, Clark, Kay, and
Sefton [19] tested Aumann’s conjecture with two-way communication and found that
informative signaling does not necessarily lead to Pareto-efficient outcomes. Blume and
Ortmann [23] studied median and minimum games, where multiple players simultaneously
sent numerical messages to signal which of the options they intended to choose in the
experiment. Their data indicated that cheap talk facilitates coordination in games with a
unique Pareto optimal equilibrium.
Many theories use the assumption of lying aversion to explain the effectiveness of
communication, just like the Ellingsen and Östling [11] paper discussed in the introduction. Demichelis and Weibull [24] introduced a small cost for lying to cheap talk model.
They found that the lexicographic communication game is evolutionarily stable when it
results in a unique Pareto-efficient outcome. Kartik [25] embeds a continuous lying cost
function for the sender in the classic model of Crawford and Sobel [26]. Unsurprisingly,
Kartik [25] finds that higher lying cost lead to more effective communication. He cites three
reasons for lying costs: penalties for misreporting (e.g., IRS audits), cost to misreporting (e.g.,
cooking the books), and finally a psychological cost to lying. Cox and Stoddard [27] use
Kartik’s model as a behavioral alternative to standard theory as a motivation to explain why
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cheap talk may improve contributions in an experiment with a common-value binary public
good game where each player receives a signal about the value of the public good, high or
low. Consistent with lying aversion, they find that players often truthfully report, contrary
to standard theory, including in a treatment with random players that lacks repeated
game effects. After running two other treatments with stronger incentives to misreport
by reducing the accuracy of player’s signals and decreasing the distance between the
marginal per capita return between the high and low states, they still find largely truthful
reporting, though players misreport significantly more relative to their initial treatment
with cheap talk.
Prior experiments show that many people experience a psychological cost of misrepresenting the truth and suggest that promises increase the credibility of communication
(e.g., [2,28,29]). Gneezy [9] carried out a test of lying aversion using a sender-receiver game
where lies increase the payoffs to the sender and hurt the receiver. The results indicated that
lying is psychologically costly and sender’s inclination to lie increases the more they stand to
gain and decreases the more receivers lose. Later, López-Pérez and Spiegelman [30] ran an
experiment to test pure lying aversion, controlling for other factors such as guilt-aversion
and altruism, and found evidence that a significant portion of subjects have a preference for
honesty. Because lying cost likely plays a role in effective communication, some formats of
communication where the sender states an intended action, a type (in a game of incomplete
information), or an explicit promise may lead to better communication compared to other
formats such as making a request that the other player select a specific action, a concept
this experiment puts to the test.
In addition to fixed form messages of intention signaling, economists have explored
the effects of other forms of communication in economic environments. For example,
Charness and Dufwenberg [2,3] studied the impact of communication on trust and trustworthiness. In their experiment, one can send a message stating “I promise to choose Roll”
(which they call “bare promises”), or leave a blank message. They find communication
promotes trust and trustworthiness, and its impact is stronger with a less restricted message
structure. Our experiment uses fixed form messaging as it allows messages clearly defined
as either a request or intention, while free form messages may include both intentions and
requests, neither intentions nor requests, or even an unclear meaning.
Finally, two recent studies examine the effect of the structure of communication on
play in games. Blume, Lai, and Lim [31] designed an experiment that compares direct communication to mediated talk in a two type “cheap talk” sender-receiver game where only
mediated talk theoretically allows for meaningful communication by garbling messages in
one of the states. Moreover, they also compared the different structures of communication:
whether using the type (“declarative”) or recommendation (“directive” ) to communicate
impacts subjects behavior in both mediated and direct talk. In the some of the mediated talk
sessions, they used a case where senders report types and receivers observe recommendations (“mediated direct mechanism”). Unsurprisingly, communication is more effective with
mediation, as predicted by theory; however, the format of the messages, whether “directive”
or “declarative”, appears to have no effect on behavior in the mediated talk sessions but “does
matter for equilibrium selection under direct talk. “Agranov and Schotter [32] studied a three
player game with an announcer and two players who simultaneously choose actions after
the announcer makes an announcement, with four states, labeled one to four, with each state
being either a coordination or Battle of the Sexes game. Because of the asymmetry of payoffs
in Battle of the Sexes, communication that pools states helps players select an efficient
equilibrium. The researchers used both human and computer announcers and compare
vague (the state is “low” or “high”) to ambiguous communication (where some of the states
are pooled, 1–3 vs. 4 in their game), and they found that both of these communication
structures perform better than a communication structure that allows only revealing the
state though ambiguous communication performs better than vague communication.1
1

We thank a referee for providing us these two references that also vary the format of language in their experiments.
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3. The Games
In order to clearly identify how the two different language structures impact economic
outcomes in all typical environments, we adopted the Mixed Motive, Stag Hunt, and
Prisoner’s Dilemma games from each of the categories of symmetric 2 × 2 economic games.
Suppose we have a generic matrix as below:


a11 a12
a21 a22
We can always transform the matrix to the following format:


a11 − a21
0
0
a22 − a12
Next, we classify all generic and symmetric 2 × 2 game into four categories shown in
Figure 1. This classification is based on [33] and [11].

Figure 1. The Four Types of Generic and Symmetric 2 × 2 Games.

In particular, Figure 2 displays the payoff matrices of the games in our study: Mixed
Motive, Stag Hunt, and Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the experiment, players send one-way
messages before playing each game. After the message is sent, each player simultaneously
chooses an action, and the combination of actions chosen by the players determines a
payoff for each player.

Figure 2. Payoff Matrices.

Following Rabin [14], we assume players’ messages consist of proposals to play
Pareto-efficient equilibria in the Mixed Motive game. Rabin [14] referred this type of
communication as “Pareto talk”. This is considered as one of the important examples of
negotiating language, where the purpose of communication is to improve from Paretodominated equilibria to Pareto-efficient equilibria. With a one-way signal, players may be
able to coordinate on one of the two Nash equilibria, (Square, Triangle) or (Triangle, Square),
in the Mixed Motive game. Each equilibria favors a different player, so the outcome of
the game likely depends on who sends the signal with the signaling player receiving the
more favorable payoff. Charness [18] defines a message as self-signaling if the signaler
wishes to convey information if and only if it is true.2 With a common understanding
2

With request based messages, we consider a truthful message as one which a sender prefers the receiver to follow.
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regarding language and sensible beliefs (e.g., players interpret a Square message as Square),
the sequential equilibrium has a message with the sender’s preferred outcome, with both
players selecting said outcome. Clearly, the sender has an incentive to follow through
with the given message, and the receiver finds the message credible. However, even in
the bizarre case a sender uses the message suggesting the equilibrium favorable to the
receiver, the receiver still has an incentive to play the recommended action (or play the
best-response to the sender’s action). Thus, the signaler in a game only has an incentive to
send honest messages in the game, i.e., what action they plan to choose or what they want
the receiver to select, regardless of intentions. Messages in the game, therefore, have the
self-signaling property, and, hence, the two separate message structures likely minimally
differ in regard to outcomes in this game.
Farrell and Rabin [34] define a message as self-committing if it creates incentives
for the signaler to fulfill it, when the other player considers the message credible. In our
Stag Hunt game, Square represents the “Stag” option, where both selecting Stag is the
Pareto-efficient outcome. When the sender states an intention to play Square (or requests
it of the receiver), the sender earns more from following through with selecting Square
when believing the receiver also chooses Square. Triangle represents the “Hare” option
which minimizes risk for players since it guarantees players a higher minimum payoff
compared to the Square option (50 vs. 20). Similar to the Square message, if the sender
uses the Triangle message, the sender earns more from following through with the Triangle
message when believing the receiver picks Triangle. Thus, both messages possess the
self-committing property making the likelihood of effective communication high.
Though the messages contain the self-committing property in our Stag Hunt game, the
Square message contains the “self-serving” property, originally defined by Aumann [35], as
players who intend to choose Triangle also should send the Square message. Thus, the Square
message lacks the self-signaling property of Charness [18] since players should send Square
regardless of their intentions. The messages, therefore, may impact the decision-making
less relative to the Mixed Motive game which has the stronger self-signaling property.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the Pareto efficient message, Square, neither possesses the self-signaling nor self-committing property, because regardless of the decision of
the other player, each player receives a higher payoff by choosing Triangle, representing the
defect strategy of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Players may try to achieve the Pareto efficient
outcome by sending the Square message. Whether players send the Triangle or Square
messages, both the sender and receiver have an incentive to choose Triangle, even if the
receiver believes the sender will choose Square. Theoretically, communication has no effect
in this game, so both forms of communication likely impact behavior in this game the least.
With an explicit cost of lying, communication may impact the messaging and/or
behavior in the game. If a player sends a Square message (representing cooperate), lying
aversion may prevent a deviation to the more profitable Triangle decision (representing
defect). Whether a receiver feels compelled to follow a Square request as an explicit cost,
however, is an open question. Lying aversion likely also affects the relative frequency of the
Square message in each treatment. Given many senders will intend to choose the dominant
action, Triangle, they will probably send more Square messages in the request treatment
where lying plays less of a role than the intention treatment. Thus, different frequencies of
messages might occur between the communication treatments in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game relative to the other two games, even if the message itself lacks any impact on the
game. Other social preferences, such as guilt aversion (e.g., [36]) where a player wants to
avoid letting another down by selecting an action that decreases the other player’s payoff,
could potentially affect behavior in this game in addition to lying cost. However, such
social preferences can’t explain the differences between Intention and Request treatments.
As long as the message is suggesting the same action, the guilty level should remain
constant regardless of the message structure.
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4. Experimental Design
Subjects play the games discussed in last section under three conditions: baseline,
intention message, request message.
In baseline, the game proceeds as follows. At the beginning of each game, we randomly
assign subjects to pairs. Then the subjects read the instructions regarding how the payoff is
determined. Next, the paired players independently choose a shape.
To avoid menu effects (e.g., coordinating on the first listed option), the visual presentation of the game lacked a default “first option.” More precisely, subjects viewed square
payoff tables (see Figure 3) before playing the game, specifically designed to eliminate the
salience of any particular option.

Figure 3. Payoff Tables.

4.1. Treatments
The two treatments with communication proceeded just as in the baseline, with the
two exceptions. First, every subject constructed a single restricted form message before
she chooses a shape. Second, after both subjects constructed their message, each subject
selected a shape as sender. Then, each subject received the message of the other player,
and, finally, each subject choose a shape as receiver. Subjects were clearly informed that
only one person in each pair would be randomly selected as sender and only one as the
receiver; moreover, players knew only the choices they made in their randomly selected
roles determined their payoff. This design doubled the amount of messages and choices
collected in each session of the communication treatments.
In the intention treatment, subjects could choose one message from the following two
to communicate with their counterparts: “I plan to choose Square” or “I plan to choose
Triangle.” In the request treatment, subjects could choose one message from the following
two to communicate with their counterparts: “I want you to choose Square” or “I want you
to choose Triangle”. Many prior studies demonstrate that adding communication in games
generally increases welfare of subjects (e.g., [15,16,18,23]). As expected, both intention and
request structures of communication made players better off relative to no communication
in our experiment. Since our goal is to determine the differences between the two language
structures, we focus on differences between intention and request in our analysis.
Table 1 lists the number of subjects per each treatment. This study used a betweensubject design, where each subject experienced exactly one treatment. In all treatments, each
subject played three different games in a random order and faced different counterparts
every game. At the beginning of each game, subjects were randomly and anonymously
paired. Between each of the games, subjects did not receive any feedback regarding the
outcome of a previously played game. At the end of the experiment, a random selection of
one the played outcomes from the three games determined the payoffs of the subjects.
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Table 1. Design of Treatments.

Total No. of Subjects

Baseline

Intention

Request

42

42

46

During the experiment, subjects were seated at separated cubicles. They read the
experimental instructions (see the screenshots in Appendix A), sent messages, and made
decisions on a computer. The investigator also read the instructions aloud to ensure subjects
understood that the information contained in them was common knowledge.
4.2. Details and Procedures
We conducted the experiments with 130 undergraduate students at a large public
university located in the Midwestern United States in March and September 2019. Subjects were recruited through the ORSEE system [37] and the games, quizzes and postquestionnaires were programmed through oTree [38]. We ran 9 sessions, with 3 sessions for
each treatment. In each session, 12–18 people were recruited through the experimental economics laboratory subjects pool. Subjects were paid $5 for showing up, and earned $16.98
on average. The experiment lasted about 50 min, and the average payoff was designed to
be slightly above the local hourly wage for subjects from the subject pool.
5. Results
5.1. Communication Strategy
Result 1. In games with self-signaling or self-committing messages, the communication strategies
are not significantly different between intention and request treatments. In games with neither selfsignaling nor self-committing messages, slightly and significantly more players suggest cooperation
with request than with intention.
In the Mixed Motive game, the two NEs are (S, T) and (T, S). Since we assume
players only do Pareto talk, when a player states “I want you to choose Triangle”, she
suggests the counterpart to choose Triangle, and directly signals her own intention to
choose Square. Analogously, when a player states “I want you to choose Square”, she
suggests the counterpart to choose Square, and indirectly signals her intention to choose
Triangle. For ease of comparison, we define the message (S, T), “I plan to choose Square”
in the treatment of intention and “I want you to choose Triangle” in the treatment of
request, as self-interested Pareto talk messages. Panel A of Figure 4 shows the percentages
of players who choose to send messages suggesting the equilibrium more favorable to
themselves in the Mixed Motive Game, denoted by the (S, T) message. Specifically, 11.7%
more senders suggest the equilibrium favorable to themselves, the (S, T) outcome, in the
intention treatment relative to the request treatment though it is not significantly different
(Mann–Whitney U test, Z = 1.093, p-value = 0.275, n1 = 42, n2 = 46)3 .
In the Stag Hunt game, (S, S) is the Pareto-efficient NE. We assume that both “I plan
to choose Square” and “I want you to choose Square” are suggesting this NE. Panel B of
Figure 4 shows the percentages of players who send Square messages in the Stag Hunt
game. The vast majority in both treatments, 88.1% and 93.5% of players with intention and
request respectively, send Square. The behavior is nearly identical and, unsurprisingly, not
significantly different between the two treatments (Mann–Whitney U test, Z = −0.872,
p-value = 0.383, n1 = 42, n2 = 46).

3

We reported the results from Mann-Whitney U test simply because it is widely adopted in experimental economics. We used two-sided tests and
consider 0.1 as the significance level given the sample size. The results documented in this section are also confirmed by Fisher’s Exact tests.
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Figure 4. Communication Strategy.

In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, (T, T) is the only NE and selecting T is a dominant
strategy. Through communication players might be able to coordinate on (S, S), a Pareto
improvement over (T, T). However, as discussed in Section 3, the Square message in
this game is neither self-signaling nor self-committing. A Square message lacks these
properties because a player earns more by choosing Triangle, regardless of the decision of
the other player. We assume that both “I plan to choose Square” and “I want you to choose
Square” are suggesting (S, S). Figure 4 shows the percentages of Square messages in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. 57.1%
and 73.9% of players send Square with intention and request respectively. More players,
roughly 17%, send Square with request than with intention with significance at the 0.1 level
(Mann–Whitney U test, Z = −1.648, p-value = 0.099, n1 = 42, n2 = 46).
5.2. Sender Behavior
Result 2. In games with self-signaling or self-committing messages, the sender behavior is not
significantly different between intention and request treatments. In games with neither self-signaling
nor self-committing messages, players significantly deviate from their suggested actions more
frequently with request than with intention.
As shown in the Panel A of Figure 5, in the Mixed Motive game players rarely deviate
from their words in either communication treatment and deviate at roughly the same
rate (16.7% after an intention and 17.4% after a request). There is no significant difference
between the treatments (Mann–Whitney U test, Z = −0.090, p-value = 0.929, n1 = 42,
n2 = 46).
In the Stag Hunt game, we find that almost the exact same percentage of players,
14.8% and 15.2%, deviate from their words and choose Triangle with an intention and a
request respectively (See Panel B of Figure 5). The difference between two treatments is not
significant (Mann–Whitney U test, Z = −0.122, p-value = 0.903, n1 = 42, n2 = 46).
As shown in Panel C of Figure 5, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, 50.0% and 69.6%
of senders deviate from their suggested actions, a 19.6% difference that is significant.
(Mann–Whitney U test, Z = −1.862, p-value = 0.062, n1 = 42, n2 = 46). Senders deviate
from their suggested actions more with request than intention.
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Figure 5. Percent of Deviation from Suggested Action.

5.3. Receiver Behavior
Result 3. The receiver behavior is not significantly different between the intention and request
treatments in each of the three games.
The ability to send messages creates an advantage in the Mixed Motive game. Receivers likely believe messages in this treatment most, given they possess the self-signaling
property discussed earlier. Hence, they have a strong incentive to adhere to the desires
of the sender. In this game, when one receives a self-interested Pareto talk message (S,
T), we define that a receiver follows the message if she chooses Triangle. Analogously,
when one receives an altruistic Pareto talk message (T, S), we define that a receiver follows
the message if she chooses Square. As shown in Panel A of Figure 6, 76.2% and 82.6% of
receivers follow the messages. The 6.4% difference between the treatments is not significant
(Mann–Whitney U tests, Z = −0.741, p-value = 0.458, n1 = 42, n2 = 46).

Figure 6. Percent of Following Suggested Action.

In the Stag Hunt game, we find that high and nearly identical percentages of receivers,
81.0% and 80.4%, follow suggested actions with an intention and a request respectively
(see Panel B of Figure 6). The difference is not significant (Mann–Whitney U test, Z = 0.061,
p-value = 0.951, n1 = 42, n2 = 46).
As shown in Panel C of Figure 6, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, only about 8%
more of the receivers follow recommendations in the intention treatment than the request
treatment, which is not significant (Mann–Whitney U test, Z = 0.785, p-value = 0.433,
n1 = 42, n2 = 46).
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6. Summary
This study compares the effect of communication from two message structures:
intention-signaling and request-signaling. In a Mixed Motive game with self-signaling
messages, where players have an incentive to send a truthful signal regardless of intentions, subjects behave roughly identical in the treatments. Similar results are found in
a Stag Hunt game, where players have an incentive to follow through with the action
if the other player believes the message. However, in a dominant strategy game, where
communication theoretically lacks any impact on behavior with most models, subjects
in the intention treatment suggest equilibrium play more often than those in the request
treatment. Lying aversion likely drives this result as players in the request treatment who
recommend the other player to choose a dominated action feel limited or no remorse for
making the suggestion. In the intention treatment, players want to avoid breaking their
word and send an honest intention.
The complexities of human language compared to most other species allows people to
coordinate and accomplish amazing feats. However, understanding the underlying theory
of why humans developed such a complex language unlike most other species remains a
mystery. Several theorists have attributed the efficiency of communication to some sort of
lying cost. Ellingsen and Östling [11] suggests that the assumption a weak preference for
honesty, stating one’s true intention, is what drives credible communication. The authors
themselves question whether changing the structure of communication would alter the
effectiveness of communication. In games where the theory of Ellingsen and Östling [11]
predicts improved coordination with intention based communication, our study shows
a request based format performs equally effectively as intention based communication,
suggesting that a preference for truthfulness may not be the underlying reason humans
communicate so effectively. We find that in games where communication lacks the property
of self-commitment, the structure of messages leads to different communication strategies
and sender behavior, as lying aversion may affect the behavior of players in the intention
treatment but not in the request treatment. Future theoretical and experimental research
could continue to explore how different formats of communication impact choices in other
dominant strategy games, such as collective action games.
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and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
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Appendix A. Screenshots of Instructions

Figure A1. Welcome Page.

Figure A2. Three Games and Payoffs.

Figure A3. Instructions of Mixed Motive Game.
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Figure A4. Instructions of Stag Hunt Game.

Figure A5. Instructions of Prisoner’s Dillema Game.
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